IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-368 / 05-0766
Filed October 25, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DOUGLAS D. DEBRUIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jackson County, J. Hobart
Darbyshire, Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions, following jury trial for first-degree
murder and first-degree theft. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant
State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland and James Kivi,
Assistant Attorneys General, and John L. Kies, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
Defendant Douglas DeBruin was charged with killing Greg May and
stealing from him. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder, in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2(1) (1999), and first-
degree theft, in violation of sections 714.1(1), 714.14) and 714.2(1). Defendant
on appeal contends (1) his motion for speedy trial should have been sustained,
(2) there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction of murder in the
first degree, (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (4) he was
denied access to the courts. We affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Defendant and decedent were friends when May, a tattoo artist and
collector of Civil War and Indian war artifacts, moved into a home in Bellevue,
Iowa. Defendant, who was on parole in the state of Wisconsin, changed his
name and moved in the basement as did defendant’s girlfriend, Julie Miller. In
mid-January of 2001 May’s family and friends became concerned about May’s
whereabouts, and a missing person’s report was filed with the Bellevue police in
February of that year. Foul play was suspected and an investigation ensued. By
this time defendant and Miller had left the area. Miller was ultimately found in
Arizona in April of 2001. She told officers that defendant killed May and the body
was in the Mississippi River. Miller initially related she was not present during
the murder but subsequently told officers defendant strangled May with a yellow
rope and she helped defendant dismember May’s body and dispose of the body
parts.
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Defendant, who testified in his own defense, admitted assisting Miller in
dismembering and disposing of the body but contended May died from a stab
wound to his chest that Miller inflicted.
SPEEDY TRIAL
The defendant contends the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss based on a denial of his right to a speedy trial. On appeal, he raises only
the claim the State did not bring him to trial within the ninety-day period of Iowa
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b).
The defendant was arrested in Arizona on April 10, 2001, on an unrelated
matter. On December 9, 2003, more than two years later, the defendant wrote to
the Jackson County Attorney and the district court requesting that the murder
investigation against him in Iowa be pursued. Because there was no pending
criminal charge, the letters were file stamped by the clerk of court and a
miscellaneous file was created for the documents. The letters are not included in
the record for this appeal.
The State filed a trial information on January 9, 2004, charging the
defendant with May’s murder, and an arrest warrant issued. At that time, the
defendant was in federal custody in Arizona. Because of a pending Wisconsin
warrant for probation violation, federal authorities would not release the
defendant to Iowa, but instead sent him to Wisconsin. On February 12, the
defendant refused to waive extradition. On February 18, the State submitted its
extradition request. The governor signed the request on February 26. On March
10, the State received an extradition approval letter from the governor of
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Wisconsin. 1 Wisconsin then paroled the defendant back into federal custody,
and he was transferred to federal prison in Indiana on March 22. On May 16, the
defendant again refused to waive extradition to Iowa. On June 10, the State
requested temporary custody of the defendant under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (IAD), Iowa Code chapter 821 (2003). On June 19, the defendant filed
a pro se motion to dismiss the trial information on speedy trial grounds. On June
22, the State submitted a written request to federal authorities requesting
temporary custody of the defendant. On June 29, federal authorities in Indiana
sent the State the IAD forms with a note that the defendant had thirty days (until
July 28) to object to the transfer to Iowa. On July 12, federal authorities offered
temporary custody of the defendant to Iowa.
In a telephonic hearing on July 16, the defendant agreed to continue the
hearing on his motion to dismiss until after his return to Iowa in August,
appointment of counsel, and arraignment. On August 6, Iowa sent its approval of
the federal offer of temporary custody. The defendant was transferred from
Indiana to Iowa on August 25, and had his initial appearance on August 27. On
August 31, the defendant filed a written arraignment form that included a notice
of his speedy trial rights and his demand for a speedy trial. The arraignment
order filed the same day set the pretrial conference for October 8 and trial for
November 8.
On October 7, the defendant filed a written waiver of speedy trial. The
next day he moved to continue the pretrial conference and trial. The court
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There is some indication the defendant had a thirty-day period within which to appeal
his extradition from Wisconsin. It is unclear whether he was available for transfer to
Iowa before any appeal period expired.
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continued trial to January 31, 2005. On November 1, the defendant moved for a
change of venue. In open court on November 10, the defendant orally waived
the speedy-trial limitation of the IAD.
On December 23, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds, alleging violation of both the ninety-day limit under Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.33 and the one-hundred-eighty-day limit of the IAD. The
State resisted on January 11, 2005, and the hearing on the motion occurred on
January 14. On January 27, the court issued its order denying the defendant’s
motion. Concerning the ninety-day period, the district court found there was
good cause for the delay and the delay was attributable to the defendant.
Concerning the IAD, the court found the defendant waived his right to a speedy
trial orally and in writing within the applicable period.
In deciding speedy trial questions, our scope of review is for correction of
errors at law. See State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001) (citing State
v. Finn, 469 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1991)). Because our review is at law, we are
bound by findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. State v. Finn, 469
N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1991). Therefore, the appellant is entitled to prevail only
if the evidence was so strong the trial court was compelled to rule for the
appellant as a matter of law. Id. A district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss
based on a speedy-trial ground is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa 2005). The district court's discretion in
ruling on such motions is narrow. Id.
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The defendant contends the court erred in not dismissing the charges
against him based on a violation of his right to a trial within ninety days of the
date the State filed the trial information. Rule 2.33(2)(b) provides:
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the
defendant's right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to
trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order
the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary
be found.
Under Rule 2.33, a criminal charge must be dismissed if the trial does not
commence within ninety days from the date of the indictment “unless the State
proves (1) defendant's waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the
defendant, or (3) ‘good cause’ for the delay.” Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 908
(quoting State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999)). Although the rule
specifies an indictment, it “applies with equal force to charges brought by trial
information.” State v. Olson, 528 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citing
State v. Clark, 351 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Iowa 1984)). “The burden of proving an
exception to the rules deadline rests squarely with the State.” Miller, 637 N.W.2d
at 204 (citing Olson, 528 N.W.2d at 653).
In ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court found:
First of all, he complains . . . he was not brought to trial within
ninety days of the date the trial information was filed. At no time
between the date the trial information was filed, however, and the
date defendant was actually returned to the State of Iowa under the
Agreement on Detainers Compact was defendant actually available
within the State of Iowa for trial. Throughout that period of time he
continued to refuse to waive extradition back to Iowa to stand trial.
The court finds there is good cause for delay, and the delay is
attributable to defendant’s unwillingness to waive extradition.
The record reveals the defendant refused to waive extradition from Wisconsin on
February 12, 2004. He acknowledges also refusing to waive extradition from
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Indiana on May 16. “Delay attributable to defendant may constitute statutory
good cause preventing the State from carrying out its obligation to bring him to
trial.” State v. Keys, 535 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Iowa 1995) (quoting State v. Donnell,
239 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Iowa 1976)). “A defendant may not actively or passively
participate in the events which delay his or her trial and then later take advantage
of that delay to terminate the prosecution.” State v. Orte, 541 N.W.2d 895, 898
(Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Ruiz, 496 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992));
see also Finn, 489 N.W.2d at 694. Substantial evidence supports the district
court’s finding the delay was attributable to the defendant and its conclusion his
right to a speedy trial was not violated. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction,
the relevant inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979)
(emphasis omitted); State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980).
Judicial review must be based on all the evidence in the record. Id. at 340. The
evidence must at least raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element
of the crime. State v. LaPointe, 418 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Iowa 1988). Evidence which
merely raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is insufficient. Id.
Defendant contends the only evidence linking him to May’s death is the
testimony of Julie Miller. The defendant contends she is an accomplice and her
testimony is not corroborated and lacks credibility. He also argues that there was
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no medical evidence as to the cause of May’s death and there was no way it
could be determined.
Iowa of Evidence Rule 2.21 (3). provides:
(3) Corroboration of accomplice or person solicited. A
conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice or a
solicited person, unless corroborated by other evidence which shall
tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense;
and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the
commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
Corroboration of the testimony of victims shall not be required.
The existence of corroborating evidence is a legal question for the court.
State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 1981). Once the legal adequacy
of the corroborating evidence is established, the sufficiency of the evidence is for
the jury. State v. Brown, 397 N.W.2d 689, 695 (Iowa 1986). Because
defendant’s challenge is to the district court's determination that corroborating
evidence existed to warrant submission of these cases to the jury, our review is
for correction of errors of law. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We view all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, even if contradicted, and
indulge in every legitimate inference that may be fairly and reasonably deduced
from this evidence. State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1980); State
v. Cuevas, 281 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Iowa 1979).
Corroborative evidence may be direct or circumstantial. State v. Bugely,
562 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Iowa 1997); State v. Vesey, 241 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Iowa
1976). It “need not be strong and need not be entirely inconsistent with
innocence.” Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d at 529. It must, however, support some
material part of the accomplice’s testimony and tend to connect the accused to
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the commission of the crime. Brown, 397 N.W.2d at 695; Vesey, 241 N.W.2d at
890.
An accomplice is a person who “could be charged with and convicted of
the specific offense for which an accused is on trial.” State v. Berney, 378
N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1985) (citation omitted). Thus, proof that the person had
knowledge that a crime was planned or proof that the person was present when
the crime was committed is insufficient standing alone to make the person an
accomplice. Id. It must be established by a preponderance of the evidence that
the person was involved in some way in the commission of the crime. Id.
When the facts and circumstances are undisputed and permit only one
inference, whether a witness is an accomplice is a question of law for the court.
State v. Douglas, 675 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Iowa 2004); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d
239, 241 (Iowa 1999). If the facts are disputed, however, or give rise to different
inferences, the question is for the jury. Id.
We assume without deciding that Miller is an accomplice; therefore we
look at her testimony and then determine if her testimony is sufficiently
corroborated.
Miller testified as a witness for the State. She related that, on January 11,
2001, defendant covered the basement laundry room in May’s house with plastic
and then stood behind May, who was seated in a chair and strangled him by
putting a yellow rope around his neck. Miller said she helped defendant drag
May’s body to the basement and put the body on top of the washer where
defendant slit May’s throat and drained the blood out of his body. The two of
them then started dismembering May’s body with a knife and a chainsaw. Miller
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said she and defendant put parts of May’s body in garbage bags. Defendant
then mixed cement and water in a five-gallon bucket and put May’s dismembered
head there. May’s arms and legs were thrown in a ravine near Bellevue, Iowa.
His torso was thrown in the Mississippi River, and his skull in the bucket was
ultimately left at a Missouri truck stop parking lot. Miller further testified they
moved May’s car so it would appear he had left town, and they got rid of May’s
clothes and furniture. Miller related she and defendant then traveled south with
part of May’s Civil War collection and attempted to sell portions of it along the
way.
Miller’s testimony is corroborated in part by defendant’s admissions.
Defendant admitted he and Miller dragged May’s body downstairs and that he
put down a plastic sheet, helped cut up May’s body, and put his head in the
bucket. Defendant further admitted throwing May’s torso in the Mississippi and
tossing May’s arms and legs in a ditch. Defendant also admitted he left May’s
car in Illinois to make it look as if May left town, and he dropped May’s clothing at
Goodwill and put the bucket with the head in the parking lot. Defendant contends
this is not sufficient corroboration, as we must separate the killing from the
dismemberment of the body.
There is other evidence corroborating Miller’s testimony. Among other
things, the skull identified as May’s was found at the Missouri truck stop and
May’s femur was found in the ravine. May’s car was found where Miller testified
it was left. Dogs trained to pick of the sent of human cadavers indicated that
there was such a scent in defendant’s Volvo, the car that Miller testified was the
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vehicle used by the couple when disposing of May’s body. Rolls of plastic and
yellow rope were found in defendant’s truck.
We also consider defendant’s arguments that Miller gave conflicting
stories, that there was testimony she was angry with May because he did not
want her to join the men in going to Florida, that at or near the time of May’s
death May’s girlfriend testified she saw through a window of the house Miller
pacing behind May’s unmoving body and doing something like she was wiping
something off and that at the time she did not see defendant. That said, we find
Miller’s testimony is sufficiently corroborated and, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, is sufficient to allow any rational trier of fact to find the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443
U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant’s appellate attorney makes an allegation that his trial attorney
was ineffective in failing to object to what he refers to as irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence.
Defendant, in a pro se brief, contends his trial attorney was ineffective in
several ways. The record is insufficient for us to address these claims and they
would best be addressed in postconviction proceedings. See State v. Shanahan,
712 N.W.2d 121, 136 (Iowa 2006) (preserving claims for postconviction
proceedings when the record is insufficient for direct review).
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DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS
In his pro se brief, the defendant contends he was denied access to the
courts. We have considered this argument and his other arguments and find
them to be without merit.
AFFIRMED.
